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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the links between human development concept and the attempt to 
implement the communist project in the countries of the former socialist bloc. It argues that the 
human development performance of the socialist system, despite its beneficial outcome for the 
‘working masses’, had little in common with actual human development. It met basic needs in 
education, health, and living standards. Under the socialist system development approaches were 
missing two major components of human development – freedom and agency. In this sense an 
emerging sense of agency in societies in the region is the major transformation outcome. The 
departure from centrally  planned and state-dominated model of development was painful, 
expensive and took long time. In some countries it is still in process with uneven progress and 
moments of reverse. But the overall trend is clear and policies that encourage people someone to 
take responsibility, act and bring about change for improving their own welfare are the best long-
term investment in human development opportunities. Still, major questions remain unanswered. 
The first is to what extent the current – market-based, consumer demand oriented – system is 
capable of going beyond those basic needs and combine economic growth with other human 
development dimensions? Has it already gone into the opposite extreme to that of the former 
communist utopia attempt –  subordinating human development to consumer demand driven 
consumption? Answering these questions goes beyond the scope of the current paper but the 
socialist countries’ experience could perhaps provide some insights for the answers. 
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The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports.   1 
1.  Introduction 
The birth of the human development concept coincided with the collapse of the socialist system. 
Was this just random coincidence or the history of the socialist experiment should be seen in 
relation to the evolution of the human development concept itself? 
1
But was it all that simple? The old system had been delivering in many aspects that are important 
from a human development perspective. After its collapse, the countries that used to be part of the 
communist project experienced profound negative backslides  in regards levels of human 
development. The way in which (and the  degree to which) human development has been 
internalized in Europe and Central Asia and translated into policies is also largely linked to the 
complex relationship between the communist experiment and human development. 
  To a certain extent the very 
collapse of the old system of political and economic governance with its underlying ideology made 
possible the rapid rise of human development from an  academic concept into comprehensive 
development paradigm. In that line of argument until 1990 the ‘sclerotic body’ of the old 
communist ideology was in fact blocking the emergence of human development as a new paradigm. 
The attribute ‘human’ and ‘humanistic’ had been  seized by the communist ideology and the 
collapse of the system cleared the scene in that regard. 
All this makes the issue of human development genealogy and its links to the communist period 
quite relevant, both from  an  historical and current policy perspective. From the  historical 
perspective it is worth asking why human development as a separate development paradigm didn’t 
                                                           
1 The ‘socialist experiment’ took on various institutional guises. The most prominently exposed (and studied) was the 
Soviet- Yugoslav-type socialism in Eastern Europe. When referring to ‘collapse of the socialist experiment’ analysts 
usually mean ‘collapse of the socialist experiment in Soviet Union and Eastern Europe’. However apart from this 
attempt to construct new type of social relations, there were (are) other attempts as well.  These include three other 
groups of projects. One  is the West European social democracy (labeled as ‘revisionism’ by orthodox communist 
ideology)—of which the concept of social inclusion can be seen as a descendent. Another (perhaps the biggest in terms 
of population coverage) is socialism in developing countries (which is still going in some places—Cuba and North 
Korea being prominent examples but including perhaps Libya and China, at least  to the extent of political system and 
the constitutional role of the communist party. Finally, socially-oriented cooperative communities/sub-national 
governance structures can be also considered as attempts to implement socialist principles (e.g., Kerala in India but not 
exclusively). The analysis refers only to the first group of countries – former USSR and Eastern Europe (where actually 
the attempt to construct the ideal society failed).   2 
emerge, say, in the 1950s or 1960s? Was it due to lack of demand for it – or lack of conceptual, 
ideological and political space occupied by the socialist ideology? What was socialist period’s 
performance in regards to human development?  
These questions have also current practical implications today. The economic crisis triggered by 
excessive debt-fueled consumption on a global scale has put into question certain basic assumptions 
about the self-regulatory nature of market economies, repositioning the question, ‘Was the socialist 
centrally-planned system that bad in terms of human development achievements?’  from 
marginalized rhetoric of ‘crypto-communists’ into practical political agendas. These questions 
receive new meaning (and new options for response) in globalized economies and societies when 
magnitudes of disparities and exclusion in some cases reach levels similar to those in pre-
revolutionary situations a century ago when the practical implementation of the socialist experiment 
took off. 
The current paper doesn’t claim to provide answers to all those questions. Its objectives are rather to 
encourage a different view on seemingly obvious issues. At the beginning the paper sketches a 
model of the major features of the society defined as ‘socialist’ to analyze it from the perspective of 
‘conduciveness to human development’. 
2
                                                           
2 The sketch is deliberately schematic and in some cases metaphoric thus far from traditional political sciences analysis. 
It is done like that on purpose. On the one hand, some of the features of the old system can be comprehended only if 
taken less seriously and with certain sense of humor (this is perhaps a major reason why investigating socialist period’s 
anecdotes can be extremely instructive). On the other hand, in the authors’ view, a lot of the socialist classics’ works 
verge on metaphoric statements and part of the problem with the communist project implementation attempt was that 
they were taken – and implemented – too literally (or in ‘dogmatic way’ as the old communist jargon would put it).  
  We deliberately do not go here into debate on the 
distinctions between ‘core USSR’ on the one hand and the rest of the socialist system. The reason is 
the sheer diversity of each national context and attempt of national (in some cases even local) 
application of the general model. We assume that this model cuts across specific national contexts 
being prominent with various degrees in different political, cultural and economic contexts. That 
degree defined as ‘proneness to adopt the socialist model’ is highly and correlated positively with 
the complexity, length and overall costs of transformation later on.   3 
2.  Communism or socialism? 
What did the people in Central and Eastern Europe experience in the years often defined as 
‘totalitarian rule’? This is not an abstract question. In orthodox Marx-Lenin’s theory and subsequent 
political practice communism was to be the classless society still to come. It was denoting the long-
term perspective, life in the future tense while ‘socialism’ was supposed to be the introductory 
phase to it. Socialism was the reality – now and here; communism was the ideal – almost there, 
already ‘seen on the horizon’ but never reachable.  
In western (and Anglo-Saxon in particular) political science terminology these societies and 
political systems were commonly referred to as ‘communist’. One reason was perhaps simplicity (to 
avoid translating the distinctions between ‘socialism’ and ‘communism’ as seen by Lenin’s 
interpretation of Marx’s theory). Another was to distinguish between ‘socialist’ and ‘social-
democratic’ tradition and political parties in Western Europe from their communist counterparts 
(actively involved in political life and in countries like France and Italy –  represented in the 
parliaments and influential in the post-World War II period). As a result certain confusion was 
introduced. Thus the same term ‘communism’ was used to denote different meaning. For westerners 
it meant the current totalitarian reality in the East; for easterners (the people experiencing this 
reality on daily basis) it was actually the constantly elusive future.  
In the current paper we use the term ‘socialism’ to denote the society functioning until 1990 and 
‘communism’ to denote either the project that was supposed to be implemented or the set of 
ideological prescriptions/dogmas under implementation. 
3
Westerners turned out to be right –communism did take place – although partially and in a different 
form its common reflection on the subject. It took place in 1918-1921, in the brief period of ‘war 
communism’ introduced after the October revolution in Russia.
 
4
                                                           
3 For detailed analysis of the evolution of Marxists theory see Kolakowski (1978).  
 The common theory tells us that it 
4 For the determinants and outcomes of the war Communism see Zimbalist, A., H.J.Sherman and S.Brown (1984: pp. 
106-112)   4 
worked sufficiently well for winning the civil war by the Bolsheviks but proved unworkable beyond 
addressing the urgent task of military-style mobilization. It was abandoned in 1921 immediately 
after the end of Civil War when command approaches to economic challenges proved increasingly 
ineffective (not mentioning efficiency at all). The New Economic Policy that replaced the ‘war 
communism’ in fact brought back elements of the market.  
‘War communism’ was abolished but not abandoned. In reality communism was latently in 
existence all the time since then, reemerging on regular basis in different forms, with different 
levels of implementation and different degrees of ‘proximity to the original design’. In fact the 
entire history of the  USSR  –  and later on of Eastern Europe –  can be seen as a history of 
competition of two mutually exclusive philosophies and economic systems (the ‘gold’ and ‘sword’ 
as Gregory Grossman put it
5) brought together by different extreme circumstances, external or 
internal, real or invented and imposed on the societies by the political elites. In 1927 the New 
Economic Policy was abolished in another attempt to fight back against reemerging private 
segments in the newly-built societies setting a pattern: the entire soviet (and later – East European) 
modern history was in fact a struggle between the desire to implement the doctrinal theses 
(inscribed in classics’ works) and the reality of life proving on daily basis the incompatibility of the 
latter with people-centered life and individual choice.
6
There are many examples that are indicative of this contradiction. One is the approach to labor 
power – is it a commodity (workers selling their ability to work) or not (as proletariats – the most 
progressive class – it can’t by definition). Another is the existence (and toleration) of extensive 
informal sector (‘second economy’) that was necessary to support the ‘formal’ system and make it 
  
                                                           
5 See Grossman (1966). 
6 This underlying contradiction between the market and the logic of the ‘command economy’ has been investigated in 
detail by Gregory Grossman (who introduced the very a term of ‘command economy’). See Grossman (1963). For a 
detailed overview of Grossman’s work see Ericson (2006).    5 
work. 
7
A wide body of literature on the nature of the centrally-planned economies and mono-party rules 
exists. Their totalitarian nature and usage of overt repression has been documented. But the specific 
nature of the bond between individuals in society defined as ‘communist’ is often not adequately 
understood. The current paper is an attempt to position the standard political science interpretation 
into a broader people-oriented context. 
  The list of such examples of ‘exceptions to the rule’ can be continued indefinitely actually 
proving that the exception was the rule and not the other way around. 
 
3.  Cogwheels and clocks
8
A major characteristic of communism with direct human development implications was its 
mechanistic vision of the society and the assigned roles of the individual as part of this mechanism. 
Society was assumed to be mechanistic and predictable, possible to plan centrally. The anticipation 
of such ‘plannability’ was direct consequence of superficially sticking to the original communist 
doctrine that sets manageability as a major feature of the communist society derived from utopian 
ideas developed later by Marx. In this context the communist society is supposed to be a 
mechanism, something like a complex clock. Each screw and cogwheel has its own defined role 
and limited freedom (if any).
 
9
According to the communist ideal model, private property doesn’t exist. The initial idea – lacking 
‘private property’ – was reconciled with the reality (the existence of such) through the introduction 
 
                                                           
7 For the role of the informal system and the degree it was interrelated with the ‘command economy’ see Grossman 
(1965) and Lavigne (1999: p. 41-43). Its role was increasing with the rise of population’s expectation of improved 
living conditions. Shubin (2007) quotes official figures, showing that in 1979 individual small-scale family farms 
(приусадебные хозяйства) accounted for only 2.8 percent of areas, while accounted for 59 percent of potato 
production, 31 percent of vegetables, 30 percent of milk, 29 percent of meat and 33 percent of eggs.  
8 This section builds on some of the messages developed in Красен Станчев, Андрей Иванов, Крокодилът е по-
зелен, отколкото дълъг. Малка теория на революцията (in Bulgarian). Култура, issue 31 (1745), 31.07.1992.  
9 This approach is reflected in both Lenin’s obsession about redistribution, subordination, the approach to the society as 
‘a single office and single factory’ (Lenin, The state and the Revolution). That vision was later materialized by Stalin in 
his GULAG economy. For detailed analysis of the degree and the nuances in which forced labor was integrated into the 
societal economic system in the period of industrialization see Gregory (2003) and Khlevnyuk (2002). See also Gaidar 
(2007).   6 
of vague distinction between ‘private property’ over supposedly means of production and 
‘individual property’ over goods of daily use – which in reality can be also used for value-added 
generation. But in reality Marx's idea of the socialization of property was realized in full through 
nobody’s/anybody’s state property and the moral acceptance of misappropriation (stealing) from the 
state was practical manifestation of the major communist predicament ‘everybody contributes 
according to his/her abilities and benefits according to his/her needs’. 
Economically, these were state-owned (although nominally ‘peoples-owned’) economies,
10  with 
private ownership of assets limited to the unavoidable minimum, with extensive focus on heavy 
industry over the other sectors (light industry, agriculture, services). In practice it was a centrally-
planned system producing chronic deficits, heavily focused on material production at the expense of 
innovation. Resource allocation was largely ideologically-driven – as was also the policy-making 
process.
11
                                                           
10 It is important to distinguish again between different national ‘models of socialism’ in which ‘people’s ownership’ 
over economic assets had different meaning – stretching from the Soviet-type state ownership to Yugoslav social 
(workers’ councils’) ownership. There were substantial differences between sectors as well (industrial and rural). In the 
case of the latter, reality was even more confusing being a mixture of approaches and practices. In USSR itself, 
nominally collective ownership (e.g., колхозы) coexisted with state ownership (совхозы). In most CEE countries land 
was not nationalized (private ownership was retained) but pooled into ‘collective farms’ or cooperatives. 
Collectivization in Central and South-Eastern Europe also varied in intensity in time (being forced in early 1950s and 
scaled back after 1956). The general pattern however was to retain state (e.g. party) control over assets using different 
instruments and subordinating the normative frameworks accordingly. 
  Improving the class structure of the society was seen as an important objective and 
criterion for selecting heavy industry sites. Production by the proletariat was not less (or even more) 
important than of generation of added value, which explains why such behemoths appeared in 
resource-scarce locations – but in close proximity to intellectual centers (Nowa Huta near Krakow 
in Poland is one but not isolated example). As a result the system was insensitive to cost/benefits 
analysis and was chronically inefficient from orthodox economic perspective (it couldn’t be because 
11 One of the most disastrous political decisions taken by the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party – the decision to 
invade Afghanistan in 1980 – was determined by the assessment of the Soviet leadership that the country has taken the 
‘path of building socialist society’. As such it was falling into the category of eligible of direct international support 
including military disregarding strategic, economic or other considerations.    7 
it was using its own definition of efficiency – ‘achieving the mandated objective disregarding the 
costs, financial, material or human’).
12
In clock-like societies markets also cease to exist (another Marxist predicament). Instead of market 
coordination there is allocation by administrative mechanisms, in most evident form in 1918-1921 
but maintained in veiled form also later on, throughout the entire socialist period. Without markets 
money is obsolete as well, which is also entirely in line with the communist doctrine. So-called 
money comes in the form of coupons for participation in distribution, or money-like lottery tickets 
whose nominal value is subject to random factors –  luck (passing by the distribution point 
nominally called ‘shop’ in the moment when goods have been just shipped), residence (living in 
capital versus anywhere else), upcoming party congress or Great Date anniversary (although the 
latter were regular and predictable making possible individual commoditization planning).  
  
Success of the individual in this society depends on his/her position in the system of distribution. 
Competitive market pressure was substituted for either permanent ‘security threat’ or soft incentives 
(доска почета). As a result the system was missing incentives for innovation, both at individual 
and company levels. Promotion patterns were either entirely within or closely related to the party 
hierarchy. Individual choice was superseded by the collective will embodied in the ‘leadership role 
of the party’. Even in cases when a multi-party system existed formally (like in central European 
socialist countries after the expansion of the socialist project after World War II), the ‘leadership 
role’ of the communist party was inscribed in the constitutions and the multi-party systems were 
part of a complex ritual with determined outcome. 
In a clock-like mechanism individual elements have no interests except that of the entirety (if 
individual interests emerge, they block the mechanism as a sudden expansion of a cogwheel beyond 
its correct size would block a clock). Thus there is no need of mechanisms to articulate and defend 
                                                           
12 It is also indicative that in Russian language at least until the end of the 1970s ‘effectiveness’ and ‘efficiency’ were 
being denoted by one term, symbiosis of both – эффективность. The issue however is not of linguistic nature. The 
very concept of efficiency was alien to the command nature of the socialist economy with its focus on physical 
indicators and obsession with ‘balance’.    8 
individual interests. Interests are replaced by roles. Policy (and politics) is reduced to performance 
and rituals. The individual choice is the choice of a  particular role in the performance. 
Unwillingness to participate in the show is being punished by direct repression at the initial phases 
of the socialist project but over time with socialism ‘maturing’ the individual roles are being 
internalized and accommodated into dual reality – official and private.  
The communist determination (the deep belief that ‘communism as the Just Society and future Eden 
is possible and in the making’) had profound impact on people’s attitudes and perceptions. Even in 
times of Stalinist repressions (and even among those repressed) the belief in the possibility of such 
system was paramount. The obvious contradiction between theory and reality was explained by 
either mistakes of growth or isolated flaws in implementation of the otherwise perfect design – but 
never as its fundamental flaw. Moral relativism (attributing human rights and justice not universally 
but according to class affiliation) was particularly helpful for reaching psychological comfort and 
reconciling the claim of being ‘the most human of all systems’ with the reality of concentration 
camps – ‘class enemies’ were simply not considered as human and thus the loss of this human life 
was not considered ‘human loss’).
13
With communism constantly ‘on the horizon’ the concept of opportunity cost was alien to socialist 
ideology – what opportunity cost when there is no alternative to communism? This ‘no opportunity 
cost’ framework was reinforced by the sense of living for the future – tomorrow matters, not today 
(and thus today’s human suffering is discounted against the marvels ‘on the horizon’). Living in 
future tense in combination with the ‘feeling of legitimate pride’ (чувство законной гордости) of 
the ordinary soviet people was also important safety value for diffusing social tensions, 
compensating for the daily shortages and difficulties of meeting even basic needs.
  
14
                                                           
13 The phenomenon is best understood through classic literature and not academic analyses. See Dostoyevsky’s ‘Бесы’, 
Андрей Платонов’s ‘Котлован’, Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s ‘One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich’ and ‘GULAG 
Archipelago’, Василий Гросман’s ‘Жизнь и судьба’. 
   
14 Another famous soviet anecdote says it all: 
A chukcha is being interviewed to become a member of the communist party.  
- What feelings were working people of Chukotka experiencing before the revolution?   9 
The mono-party rule is also well-known and widely described but usually with a focus on 
authoritarian mechanisms of decision-making. Even more important however was the paternalistic 
nature of that rule. The individual has been taken care of by the state (the Party, the Leader) and 
thus largely released of the burden of responsibility. In fact, the desired role of the individual was 
that of a nail in the system or a simple cogwheel in the complex mechanism. 
Human societies however are not clocks; they tend to resemble clouds.
15
Applying the clock/clouds metaphor indeed helps us to understand the way communist societies 
worked and the role ascribed to the individual in them. The socialist experiment (building 
communist society) was an attempt to transform a cloud into a clock. A necessary precondition in 
that regard is indeed transforming the role of the individual into cogs and wheels meaning primarily 
high level of discipline of individual elements. 
  They experience storms 
and lightning, rains and droughts; they can expand and squeeze, have highs and lows, and usually 
behave in rather unpredictable manner constantly deviating from the initial design. This constant 
deviation was accompanying the entire attempt to materialize the communist project. 
16
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
- The feeling of cold and the feeling of hunger. 
- And what feelings they experience now? 
- The feeling of cold, the feeling of hunger and the feeling of legitimate pride.  
  This can (has been) achieved in two ways – 
through coercion (imposing the discipline externally through fear and repression) or through self-
disciplined (by adopting the belief that belonging to the clock mechanism is the historically right 
choice). Both result in a set of rituals shared and internalized by individuals (individual Homo 
Sovieticus)  to  different degrees. Some honestly believed in the ritual (and whole-heartedly 
participate in it); others are aware of and fear the consequences of dissent (and just participate). The 
share of the former group progressively diminishes as life achieves  more and more signs of 
normality and as knowledge and information spreads.  
15 The comparison between clocks and clouds introduced by Karl Popper is strikingly adequate for describing the 
evolution and collapse of the socialist experiment. See Karl Popper, ‘Of Clouds and Clocks,’ in Objective Knowledge: 
An Evolutionary Approach (London: Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1972), 206-255 
16 Evgeny Zamiatin’s anti-utopia ‘We’ is a persuasive illustration of this phenomenon.    10 
The clock metaphor is also useful in responding to the question regarding inclusive aspects of the 
old system. The cogs are included into the clock by default. Similarly the old society was inclusive 
of those who shared its principles and followed the rituals (at least nominally). The others were not 
considered as part of the society and not counted thus easily achieving rate of social inclusion of 
100 percent. Those ‘others’ were either treated as ‘alien class elements’ smashed by force or as 
some kind of ‘defective individuals’ (homosexuals, people with metal disorders, with other 
disabilities) who were subject to either ‘reeducation or isolation’.
17
Participating in the ritual was the major determinant of inclusion and a major internal cohesive 
force of communism. At certain moment however a critical mass of people is not sufficiently afraid 
anymore and ceases participating in the rituals. That moment marks the end of the socialist project – 
and this is also the explanation why actually communism collapsed so abruptly. Simply put, there 
are not enough people to believe – or pretend they believe.
 
18
Of course, the pattern outlined above is schematic – and deliberately so in order to illustrate the role 
and implications of belief and rituals in the implementation of the communist project. The flip side 
of the story is the historical perspectives and lessons learned (both by societies and the political 
elites) in the process of the system’s ‘maturing’. Different models of socialism and its reform 
(Yugoslav, Polish, Hungarian, and Czechoslovak, to mention just the most prominent ones) tested 
various approaches to and combinations of market and state in the economy as well as various 
degree of tolerance of ideological and political descent. Market coordination and private ownership 
(mostly of land in agriculture but also of productive assets in small scale manufacturing) never 
really went away. As a result of the persistent attempts of reforms and ‘pushing the boundaries 
 
                                                           
17 The approach to disabilities is good illustration in that regard. The standard definition (still) used is ‘invalids’ – 
people that are not ‘valid’. It has explicit connotation of non-existence and non-belonging to the otherwise bright 
project. It is not accidental that long after the WW2 there were no disabled people on the streets of Moscow and other 
big cities – not because war didn’t disable permanently hundreds of thousands but because their image was inconsistent 
with the new socialist reality and thus those people were kept away from public eyes. 
18 The analysis of Hoffer (1951) is particularly helpful in understanding the internal cohesion of communist societies as 
a society based on belief.     11 
further’, by the 1980s, countries like Hungary and Poland were somewhere in the middle between 
the typical Soviet model and western-type market economies (which explains their transformation 
success stories).  
The communist nomenklatura was evolving and internally diversifying as well. The diversity of 
models of socialism had its inevitable reflection in diversity of views on its perspectives. The 
feasibility of ‘peaceful coexistence’ between plan and market (increasingly apparent in the 1970s 
and 1980s) led to similar hypotheses in regards to party elite, which was increasingly dominated by 
technocrats convinced that they could transform their political capital into economic capital. That’s 
how the declining fear from the formerly-omnipotent system in combination with increasing 
cynicism among part of the nomenclature willing (and ready) to seize the opportunity of 
reincarnation in the new market-based economy brought about the systemic change in the region. 
The keyword here is ‘combination’, which also explains why the system didn’t collapse abruptly 
elsewhere. 
 
4.  What development? Basic needs 
Seen from today’s perspective it may be amazing how such a society could work –  and be 
maintained for decades. And still, it did. Even more: twenty years after its collapse it still has its 
fans and supporters. Why the communist idea had such strong appeal? In order to answer that 
question  a  human development lens should be used –  both to understand its origins and its 
performance. 
From human  development perspective, it is worth remembering  that the attempt to realize  the 
communist utopia
19
                                                           
19 See Aleksandr M. Heller and Mikhail Nekrich, 1982.  
 succeeded in a society 56 years after the abolition of serfdom, heavily rooted in 
traditional values, marked by deep social cleavages. In these conditions the idea of a society ruled 
by a monolithic party speaking the voice and advocating the needs of the masses is quite appealing.   12 
The alternative to mono-party centrally-planned pattern of development –  parliamentary 
democracies with autonomous market agents – was rather irrelevant from this perspective. Why 
maintain a parliament (whose purpose is to build consensus between different interests) when the 
interest is one – meeting basic needs? Why need civil society or rule of law when ‘we are all equal 
in our poverty’ and the major law was that of class struggle? That was the Russian society prior to 
the October revolution (which actually broke out on 7
th  November 1917 new style calendar). 
Figures 4.1-4.7 provide an idea of the human development gaps the pre-revolution Russia was 









                                                           
20 Graphs 4.1-4.6 are based on Mironov B.N., 1991. USSR stands for Russian Empire in pre-revolution years. Graph 4.7 
is based on A. Maddison, 2006. The World Economy: historical statistics. OECD, 2006. In Graph 7 twelve Western 
Europe states include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerand, United Kingdom; seven East European Countries include Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia. 














60 years  13 
Figure 4.2. Female life expectancy at birth, years 
 
 





































literacy  14 
Figure 4.4. Female literacy rate 
 
 





































below 50‰  15 
Figure 4.6. Share of urban population 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Per capita GDP (1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars) 
 
 
The consistency between the level of sophistication of the task and the response mechanisms is 
known from a systemic approach. What is often been missed is the adjustment mechanisms due to 











































































































Western Europe-12 East Europe-7 USSR  16 
(simplification, primitivization) of response mechanisms. This simplicity was more appealing in 
traditional societies exactly because of the consistency between challenges and mechanisms, which 
is also one of the major reasons behind the communist ideology’s appeal for post-colonial societies 
facing the challenge of modernization and the task of meeting basic needs. 
22
Yes, the former system was nominally human-centered and human-oriented. It was promoting 
brotherhood, equity, justice and equal opportunities. Human dignity was supposed to be at its core 
and the fact that these ostensibly human-centered objectives were sometimes pursued by non-
humane means (including overt repression) was seen as a minor detail. Ideologically and politically, 
the system claimed the role of the ‘most human of all possible systems’ and prided itself on 
protecting human values against ‘bourgeois exploitation’. The former socialist bloc’s public space 
was littered with ‘human’ terminology and slogans in all possible variations reflecting some basic 
building blocs of socialist ideology. But it was about an abstract human, the one from the poster 
being dragged through the Red Square on 7
th November manifestation. It was not the individual 
citizen because the latter was diluted in the collective body. 
 With progress in that 
matter (regardless of the pattern in which it was achieved and its costs) the relative appeal of the 
ideological simplicity diminishes –  and the public conscience becomes more open to human 
development language and concepts. 
Here we come to the first important conclusion regarding the human development performance of 
the socialist system. Even assuming its beneficial outcome for the ‘working masses’ (it is highly 
questionable for the 1920s and 1930 given the human toll of collectivization, forced 
                                                           
22 The competition in that matter between ‘Marxist Leninist development’ and market based approaches to development 
is illustrative. The ‘Basic Needs’ concept was articulated by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1976 – the 
time when the socialist system was just starting to experience decline in growth rates and was still appealing in hearts 
and minds of post-colonial societies.  See ILO (1976: p. 15)   17 
industrialization and repressions but is acceptable for the 1960s and 1970s), it had little in common 
with human development. It was meeting basic needs in education, health, living standards. 
23
The data summarized in tables above indeed illustrate the  USSR’s progress in major human 
development indicators. What they do not visualize are the two major components of human 
development that were missing – freedom and agency. 
  
 
5.  Freedom and agency 
The role of the cogwheel is inconsistent with human development. The communist ideal in its pure 
form was providing the cogwheels with resources to meet their basic needs. Adding agency and 
freedom is Sen’s contribution that goes beyond simple development economics. Cogwheels are not 
free – even if their needs have been met and the mechanism well oiled. Similarly, the individual 
whose will has been diluted in the collective is not an agency even when the members of that 
collective totally identify themselves with it. In other words, they did not have ‘the substantive 
freedoms he or she enjoys to lead the kind of life he or she has reason to value’
24
This conclusion explains the appeal of communist-type projects in societies facing earlier 
challenges of modernization (and thus the task of responding to their populations’ basic needs). The 
moment when the vision of individual well-being and liberties become ‘decollectivized’ and the 
formerly ideologically-driven societies lose their internal cohesion, these societies start cracking. 
This brings us to the second conclusion: normality (losing the leverages of emergency pressure 
; instead they had 
no choice but lead a way of life they have been expressively persuaded is the only one they have a 
reason to value. In other words, it was done on their behalf and the only possible alternative was 
non-participation, internal dissent (отказничество). 
                                                           
23 Analysis of HDI trends in 93 countries for the period 1970-2007 suggests that poorer countries see a faster increase in 
their HDIs than richer countries – largely attributable to drops in child mortality rates and increases in literacy. See 
Klugman, J., Scott, T. (2009: 17) and Molina, G.G., Purser, M. 2009. 
24 Sen (1999: p. 88).    18 
mobilization) deals the decisive blow to socialist doctrine and its attempt at materialization.
25
The argument works also in reverse. The collapse of the former system can be attributed to 
improved levels of human development –  the moment a critical mass of people turned from 
cogwheels into individuals with agency, the old system collapsed. Again, following Marx’s theory, 
the old rule bred its own negation.  
 Or, 
put in a different way, the collapsing socialist project opens the way to the human development 
paradigm. It’s almost a remake of Lenin’s slogan prior to the October revolution: yesterday (when 
meeting basic needs was on the agenda) it was too early; tomorrow (when societies go beyond their 
immediate material concerns) it will be – might be – too late. 
So why former socialist countries score so well in regards human development? The answer is 
simple: they score well in regards to meeting basic needs, not human development. Which brings us 
to the last conclusion: all those 20 years we are promoting an index – HDI – which is in fact BNI 
(Basic needs Index). Sure, it’s better than GDP as a gauge for measuring progress of societies – but 
we must admit, it’s not HDI… 
As to the question how the old system managed to strive, the answer is ‘at huge cost’. It was 
capable of maintaining itself only with huge resources and inflow of technologies reflected in 
increasing indebtedness in 1980s. Figure  5.1  summarizing data on foreign debt dynamics in 
‘socialist camp’ countries illustrates the simple message that the communist project was simply not 
sustainable economically and was in need of permanent inflow of resources (and this is only 
partially due to its unaffordable social protection and social spending not matched by respective 
levels of productivity
26
                                                           
25 The statement above is equally applicable both to Europe and China or other post-socialist countries. They simply 
witnessed different pattern of departure from socialist project – accompanied by dissolution of an empire (USSR) or 
establishing a ‘state capitalist’ system under the auspices of the party-state (China). North Korea is another proof in that 
regard sticking to the old ideological framework – and inevitably resorting to an external threat as means for societal 
mobilization.  
). 
26 This is what Janos Kornai has called ‘premature welfare states’ (Kornai, 1992). The real picture of aggregated debt 
(borrowed living standards) is much more staggering given the complex multi-layer system of allies subsidization 
through preferential pricing of energy resources or other commodities export. This policy started after the first cracks in   19 
 
Figure 5.1. Net foreign debt of socialist countries, bln US$ 
 
 
The system was effective in extreme circumstances like winning a major war or sending a man into 
space  –  following exactly the pattern of the war communism of 1918-1921. But it was never 
efficient and was  not capable to routinely innovate and modernize and started falling apart in 
periods of normality, when costs and efficiency became increasingly an issue. This was particularly 
the case when knowledge and innovation started emerging as a major driver of economic growth 
and progress of societies in general. As any cogwheel society, it is capable of performing, not 
reforming. The dynamics and constant need of innovation of post-industrial age makes cowheel 
societies increasingly uncompetitive (or competitive at an increasingly high price). 
 
6.  Lost in transition 
The data outlined above explain why the communist project was appealing for societies facing the 
challenge of meeting basic needs. But it still doesn’t explain the nostalgic attitudes among 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
the system after 1956 with preferential grain exports to Poland and other Warsaw pact members and continued for 















USSR  20 
significant number of citizens of the former ‘socialist camp’ even two decades after its collapse. 
Fading memories of the oppressive nature of the old regime is one commonly used explanation. 
Lack of personal experience with the repressive or aspects communism or its notorious shortages 
(when it was taking heroic efforts to secure every-day living) is another. Both of these explanations 
seem to be missing important aspects of ‘the old system’s hype’. 
In order to understand it, we need to look in-depth into what was lost – and what was gained – 
during the transition. Figure 6.1 summarizes the attitudes of the population of countries – former 
USSR republics – towards its collapse registered by Wave 11 of representative Eurasia Monitor 
survey.  Not surprisingly, the highest share of negative attitudes towards the collapse of USSR is 
found in Russia and Belarus while the lowest – in Georgia, Lithuania and Estonia. Figure 6.2 
correlates these attitudes (namely the difference between the share of those assessing positively and 
negatively the collapse of the USSR) with GDP per capita. It generally suggests that the nostalgic 
attitudes are prevalent among societies with low GDP. Russia’s notable exception (combination of 
high GDP per capita and high levels of nostalgia) can be attributed to ‘collapse of the empire’ 
phenomenon. Belarus is the second similar case, most probably due to the delayed political reforms 




 Figures 6.3 and 6.4 test the correlation between USSR nostalgia and 
major human development indicators – life expectancy and secondary level gross enrollment rate. 
The correlation is statistically significant. 
                                                           
27 For graphs 6.1-6.4 perception data are taken from Eurasia Monitor. It uses methodology similar to European 
Barometer to estimate perceptions in the countries of former USSR. The project was initiated in 2004 by a number of 
sociological research groups from the countries of the former Soviet Union, including VCIOM in Russia 
(http://www.eurasiamonitor.org/eng/about/participants.html). The study is conducted in waves devoted to particular 
topics. Wave 11, conducted in mid-2009 looked on the issues of perception of Soviet history. The socio-economic data 
is taken from the WB WDI database.   21 
Figure 6.1. Attitude towards the breakdown of the USSR 
 








































































































































































































Lithuania  22 




Figure 6.4. Attitude towards  the breakdown of the USSR and secondary school gross 
enrollment rate, weighted by population 
 
 
































































































7  23 
 
Figures 6.5 and 6.6
28
 
  follow similar pattern and illustrate the attitudes towards two landmark events 
in Soviet history – mass collectivization and industrialization.  The graphs illustrate the shares of 
respondents having clear opinion excluding those who agree with both options and those who don’t 
have an opinion. 
Figure 6.5. Attitudes towards collectivization 
 
 
                                                           
28 Source: Eurasia Monitor, Wave 11, URL: http://www.eurasiamonitor.org/rus/research/event-162.html and 
http://www.eurasiamonitor.org/rus/research/event-155.html.  
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Mass collectivization is a bloody crime of the Stalin regime, which consiously exterminated the best of the peasnats
Mass collectivization was a rapid and necessary way to pump resources from villages to towns, from agriculture to
industry; in 10 years the communists achieved what countries normally achieve in a much longer period of time  24 
Figure 6.6. Attitudes towards industrialization 
 
 
Apart from living conditions (roughly reflected in GDP per capita) and glorification of historical 
events (reflected in the perception of collectivization and industrialization), a major determinant of 
nostalgic attitudes are opportunities. The change of the system provided new opportunities but not 
everyone could take advantage of them (as seen from Figure 6.7 and 6.8 summarizing the results of 
the recent survey on social exclusion conducted by UNDP in 5 countries of the former ‘socialist 
camp’
29
                                                           
29 Survey on social exclusion, UNDP 2009. 
). As shown on Figure 6.7, among a set of opportunities only ‘possibility to express what 
you think’ receives higher share of positive responses than negative in most countries (and cynics 
would say, this freedom to express yourself has been matched by the freedom to be disregarded). 





































































































































Industrialization  was a reckless adventure of the Stalin regime at cost of millions human lifes
Industrialization is a greatest achievent of soviet power, which brought the country to the new level of
development  25 
countries. In all six countries surveyed the opportunity to get a job is perceived to have worsened. 
Amazingly similar is the perception of ‘having access to justice’, which is seen to have worsened in 
five out of the six countries (with respondents in Moldova seeing no change). Figure 6.8 gives a 
clue why. Given the fact that former party elites (and party membership related clientelism) 
reincarnated into market reality through ‘ruling parties businesses’. That largely explains the fact 
that in most countries surveyed (Kazakhstan being the exception) a significant percentage of people 
think that today it is more important to be well connected to political elites to get ahead than it was 
25 years ago. 
 
Figure 6.7. Perspectives now and then 
   
Note: Chart shows the difference between those seeing ‘better opportunities’  and those seeing 
‘worse opportunities’ 
 
Today are your opportunities better, worse  or the same 









Kazakhstan Moldova Macedonia Serbia Tajikistan  Ukraine
To achieve a good standard of living The express what you think
To achieve the level of education that you desire To start a business
To have a good job To have access to justice  26 
Figure 6.8. Importance of connections now and then 
 
 
The third bloc of determinants of this frustration with the new system (status and opportunities 
being the first two) is perhaps the most important from human development perspective. Human 
development is not just about meeting basic needs – it’s about agency. The emerging sense of 
agency in societies in the region is perhaps the major achievement of transition. 
 
7.  Found in transition 
The data on agency
30
                                                           
30 Agency refers to a person’s ability to pursue and realize goals that he or she values and has reason to value. An agent 
is ‘someone who acts and brings about change.’ The opposite of a person with agency is someone who is forced, 
oppressed, or passive. In the context of this paper a cogwheel in a clock is the exact opposite of a person with agency. 
 are very limited. One way to measure it could be through the World Values 
Survey. Two of its questions can be related to agency. The first one is about freedom of choice, 
when people are asked to evaluate their freedom of choice and control over lives on a scale from 1 
How important has it been to be well connected to 









Kazakhstan Moldova Macedonia Serbia Tajikistan Ukraine
Now 25 years ago  27 
to 10 where 1 is ‘no control’ and 10 means ‘a great deal of control’ 
31. The second is the perception 
of  the  government’s responsibility, which shows people’s attitude toward government versus 
individual responsibility in provision where 1 means ‘people should take the responsibility’ and 10 
means ‘government should take responsibility
32. Data are available for a number of countries of 
region
33
The data from the two waves reveal an interesting picture of ‘agency formation’ in countries in the 
region. After the first phase of transformation most of the countries reached similar  levels  of 
support for individual responsibilities over one’s life. But as Figure 7.1 shows, this support was 
loosely correlated with the perception of governments’ responsibilities most probably reflecting the 
momentum of socialist-period perception of the state as ‘caretaker’. 
 in a number of waves. One wave was done in the middle of transition, in 1994-1999, the 
most recent wave was conducted in 2005-2007. 
 
                                                           
31 The question was formulated in the following way: ‘Some people feel they have completely free choice and control 
over their lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this 
scale where 1 means ‘none at all’ and 10 means ‘a great deal’ to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you 
feel you have over the way your life turns out.’ 
32 The question was formulated in the following way: ‘People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves 
(1) versus the government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for (10)’ 
33 Former USSR: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine. New 
Member States: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia. The Balkans: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey   28 
Figure 7.1. Attitudes towards individual versus government responsibilities 
 
 
The situation changes substantially in 2005-2007 when the longer term transformation implications 
have kicked in (Figure 7.2). Most of the countries shifted up the vertical axis suggesting that in 
general feeling of freedom and control over own life increased. What is even more important, the 
correlation between the two  variables (feeling of freedom and perception of governments’ 
responsibilities) changes. If at the first stage of transition higher support for government 
responsibility was associated with the feeling of higher freedom of choices, a decade later the 
relationship reversed. Now, the desire for higher government provision is associated with lower 
feeling of freedom and control over one’s life. However, despite this change in attitudes, the overall 
level of support for development associated with more government responsibilities still remains 
































































































Serbia and Montenegro Poland  29 
Figure 7.2. The potential support for individual versus state responsibilities 
 
 
Having said ‘development’, it is interesting to look at possible correlations between the emergence 
of agency and development outcomes.  Figures 7.3—7.4 outline the correlation between results of 
transition and attitude toward government responsibility. We use the ratio of GDP per capita PPP in 
2008 to 1990 as a proxy of success of transition. Another indicator of transition performance is 
transitional decline (percentage loss of GDP per capita PPP between 1991 and 1996). Both charts 
reveal a similar picture—transition performance and transition outcomes negatively correlate with 
reliance on government. In other words, higher expectations of government provision are associated 
with deeper transition decline and with worse per capita GDP ratio. It is important to notice that this 
correlation does not imply causality, which could be indeed reverse: worse economic performance 
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Hungary  30 
Figure 7.3. Economic dynamics and anticipated responsibilities of the government 
 
 















































































































Croatia  31 
Figure 7.5 outlines the same phenomenon but from the perspective of freedom of choice. Higher 
level of freedom of choice and control over one’s life is correlated with lower levels of transition 
decline. This graph is not entirely symmetrical to Figure  7.4  because of  the more nuanced 
relationship between anticipated governments’ role and individual responsibilities. They can indeed 
go hand in hand, depending on the specific meaning and scope of responsibilities as well as the 
overall level of crisis-induced economic insecurity increasing support for increased governments’ 
role. The remark regarding the causality is valid in this case as well. 
 
Figure 7.5. Freedom of choice and transition outcomes 
 
 
The data summarized in the graphs above should be seen in the broader context of a system that for 
decades was nominally promoting human development values. The former socialist bloc’s public 
space was not just littered with ‘human’ terminology and slogans  and the problem (from the 
system’s perspective) was that at certain point those slogans and nominal values were gradually 
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Moldova  32 
erecting a new society and new type of relationships based on human values. The ‘feeling of pride’ 
was half sarcastic but in fact was gradually internalized. People started to take it seriously.
34
To what extent this was genuine belief, and to what extent it was just a psychological escape 
mechanism that was helping manage the stress and desperation associated with everyday life within 
the communist project is hard to say. This attitude was surely determined by the place the particular 
cogwheel was holding in the complicated mechanism. It is also difficult to assess the extent to 
which official ideology was promoting the human-oriented sound bites in order to disguise its own 
failures in meeting basic needs, versus the extent to which the failures were genuinely seen as the 
inevitable cost of achieving the goals of higher level of moral value. 
 
35
To what extent this was genuine belief, and to what extent it was just a psychological self-escape 
mechanism that was helping manage the stress and desperation associated with everyday life within 
the communist project is hard to say. This attitude was surely determined by the place the particular 
cogwheel was holding in the complicated mechanism. It is also difficult to assess the extent to 
which official ideology was promoting the human-oriented sound bites in order to disguise its own 
failures in meeting basic needs, versus the extent to which the failures were genuinely seen as the 
inevitable cost of achieving the goals of higher level of moral value.  However regardless the 
underlying intentions, the system was explicitly focused on knowledge, culture and individual 
development opportunities that went beyond the narrow materialistic dimensions. 
 However regardless of the 
underlying intentions, the system was explicitly focused on knowledge, culture and individual 
development opportunities that went beyond the narrow materialistic dimensions. 
This aspect of the old system is usually misinterpreted and underestimated. The focus usually is 
being put on the social aspects of the socialist society. Given the chronic shortages and overall 
                                                           
34 The tone in that regard was set by Mayakovski in his poem ‘Soviet passport’.  
35 One particular phrase encompasses it nicely – нам не до этого. It means, ‘We have much more important challenges 
to address now and can’t waste time on prosaic issues like the production of bread or manufacturing of some home 
appliance of decent quality. The Bigger Goal was the justification of the current suffering and shortages. It was always 
in future tens and could include producing a nuclear bomb (to respond to imperialists’ threats), to catch-up with steel 
production or simply, at the most general level, to reach the desired communist society.    33 
focus on gross indicators, on mass scale it was not delivering beyond basic needs.
36
Perhaps the most crucial aspect of the human development implications of the old system is related 
to the latter’s internalization of its own messages. Once the internal contradictions between 
nominally promoted human values and repressive instruments were resolved through the denial of 
‘being human’ for ‘alien class elements’, the rest of the ‘progressive masses’ were entitled – and if 
necessary, forced into – human development as understood by the communist ideology. One of its 
major elements was literacy, education and culture. Promoting these incremental aspects of human 
development was perhaps the major achievement of the communist project. Given however the link 
between knowledge, education and individual values, these policies were increasingly undermining 
the foundations of the system (the cogwheel nature of the individual) ultimately bringing the system 
to an end. 
 But it was not 
supposed to! The communist project was explicitly non-materialistic in its basic values being 
promoted and this was one of the foundations of its appeal. Consumerism was an object of disgrace 
in the official propaganda (again, both in a self-explanatory loop to justify the failure of meeting 
‘higher level’ consumer needs but to certain degree in a sincere belief in superior non-consumer 
values). Failure to deliver on the consumer side for some time was been compensated by delivery 
on the symbolic side; when the production of symbols and abstract ‘human values’ or ‘pride’ was 
exhausted came the beginning of the end. 
This is how two human development related trends determined the collapse of the communist 
project. On the one hand, its decline was largely related to the quest for a better life – both in terms 
of individual freedoms and material goods. Despite its deep internal contradictions, the socialist 
societies were able to maintain apparent stability at high human and financial cost. The proportion 
between the two was changing over time with direct human losses being brought to minimum in the 
                                                           
36 Another word of caution is necessary here. The very meaning of ‘shortage’ was relative. It meant one thing in USSR 
and something completely different in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, or East Germany. In the case of the latter the 
phenomenon of the ‘socialist showcase’  should be also taken into consideration – a society and economy being 
subsidized within COMECON in order to visualize socialism’s virtues vis-à-vis the adjacent capitalist West (Berlin).   34 
1980s (usually associated with ‘decay of socialism’). The financial costs of maintaining the system, 
the opposite, was soaring – largely covered from debt. The old system was replaced by a new one – 
much better equipped to meet consumers’ demand in efficient way. But on the other, it was made 
possible thanks to maturing of cogwheels into individuals and the emergence of agency. The latter 
was the ultimate outcome of the old system’s deliberate investments in education and culture.  
Seen from the perspective of former socialist economies’ human development record, one can 
observe a striking similarity with the situation today. The global economy has replicated one of the 
features of central planning that led it to its collapse: debt-financed consumption and shifting the 
burden to future generations. The difference is in the mechanism of utilizing the cash injections – in 
the former system these were compensating for the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of the economic 
systems; in the current globalized market economy they have typical job-creation purpose 
supposedly boosting demand through boosted consumption. This is an area in which both systems 
(the ideologically based communism and market based global capitalism) dangerously concur. The 
former was remote from human development incentives. The latter is driving away from these 
incentives. The role of agency is being increasingly replaced by the ‘creation of demand’ that is 
supposed to generate the markets for the supply.  
The focus on people and their well-being as the ultimate objective of economic growth is what 
makes the concept of human development intuitive and appealing. Prospects for the enhancement of 
people’s potential to be and do are placed at the core of the human development paradigm. In the 
human development context, to have is a means, rather than the end of human progress. The old 
system entirely disregarded the ‘means’ function trying to substitute it for noble but hollow slogans. 
The system that replaced it went to the opposite extreme – at least in developed economies today 
where the relationship between output and human development has been reversed. Consumption 
(economic output) has turned from a means for achieving functionalities and expanding 
opportunities  into an end in itself. The consumer is being increasingly flooded with cheap   35 
‘disposable’ goods that may meet demand, but only less so (if at all) meet real needs with each 
consecutive increase of commodities contributes less to human capabilities. 
The moment a commodity acquires a value that is independent of the needs (functionalities) it is 
supposed to fulfill, we are facing the phenomenon of ‘commodity fetishism’, which starts 
underpinning the structure of economic incentives. The growth in production and output in the last 
decade increasingly became an objective in its own right, subordinating consumption needs and 
thus turning people’s capabilities into a macroeconomic residual. An increase in consumer spending 
– regardless of its type (does it expand people’s capabilities or not?) and sustainability (is it credit 
or savings-based?) is still seen as the way out of the crisis. The fact that consumers in most of the 
world are now reducing spending in order to reduce personal debt (the paradox of thrift) is seen as a 
disaster from a macroeconomic perspective. In fact, consumers are behaving rationally from a 
human development perspective–unlike governments, which are attempting to restore pre-crisis 
consumption patterns, thus reinforcing the very system that brought about the crisis. Shopping for 
things you never even thought you might need could turn into a patriotic duty and personal input 
into the rescue of the global economy. 
The reference to Marx’s ‘commodity fetishism’ is not accidental. Paradoxically human 
development is an important factor both at the beginning of the communist project and at its end. It 
was a response to 19th century societies’ inability to provide such opportunities to its citizens and it 
collapsed largely because of the same failure. The open question is to what extent the current 
consumer-driven society can address the same task better. While in the socialist era the freedoms to 
lead the life one has reason to value were limited by ideological institutions, in post-socialist 
societies the limitations are increasingly coming from peer citizens and result in social exclusion of 
people who don't share prevailing consumerism values or resist to succumb to the pressure of the 
new ‘trend economy’.
37
                                                           
37 Russian band Leningrad performed a song ‘Manager’ with the following lines: 
 With economies being increasingly driven by fashion trends when imposing   36 
new models and designs with the same functionalities is incremental for maintaining the demand-
supply cycle perspectives to genuinely address human development challenges are not certain at all. 
 
8.  Conclusions 
To summarize, the story of the attempt to implement the communist utopia was expensive and 
inefficient modernization experiment. It provided opportunities to meet basic human needs that 
were effectively preparing the ground for the human development paradigm. The further the society 
moves away from a ‘clock design’ to a ‘cloud design’, the higher the chances for human 
development approaches to take root. The argument works also the other way around – the higher 
‘degree of cogwheel-ism’, the slimmer the chances of human development. The question of the cost 
– and efficiency – of meeting basic needs in the framework of the socialist system, were there 
alternative options and would they have been more efficient is hard to answer. 
Emergence of agency increasingly appears as a major gain of transition for the societies in the 
region. The departure from centrally-planned and state-dominated model of development was 
painful, expensive and took long time. In some countries it is still in process with uneven progress 
and moments of reverse. But the overall trend is clear and policies that encourage people someone 
to take responsibility, act and bring about change for improving their own destiny are the best long-
term investment in human development opportunities. 
Still, major important questions remain unanswered. The first is to what extent the current – market-
based, consumer demand oriented – system is capable of going beyond those basic needs. To what 
extent can it combine economic growth with other human development dimensions? Has it already 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
For me money are papers 
For you they are freedom 
American dream is trendy now 
And you are rushing toward this dream: 
To work as a robot for this paper dream. 
[…] 
This is your age, your computer era 
The most important is not a person but his career 
You are lucky, you are different 
You are working in an office now   37 
gone into the opposite extreme to that of the former communist utopia attempt – subordinating 
human development to consumer demand driven consumption? Answering these questions goes 
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